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Abstract. We investigate some differential properties for permutations
in the affine group, of a vector space V over the binary field, with re-
spect to a new group operation ◦, inducing an alternative vector space
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1 Introduction
Most modern block ciphers are built using components whose crypto-
graphic strength is evaluated in terms of the resistance offered to at-
tacks on the whole cipher. For example, differential properties of Boolean
functions are studied for the S-Boxes to thwart differential cryptanalysis
([3,10]).
Little is known on similar properties to avoid trapdoors in the design of
the block cipher. In [6] the authors investigate the minimal properties for
the S-Boxes (and the mixing layer) of an AES-like cipher (more precisely,
a translation-based cipher, or tb cipher) to thwart the trapdoor coming
from the imprimitivity action, first noted in [11] .
In [8], Li observed that if V is a finite vector space over a finite field
Fp, the symmetric group Sym(V ) will contain many isomorphic copies of
the affine group AGL(V ), which are its conjugates in Sym(V ). So there
are several structures (V, ◦) of a Fp-vector space on the set V , where
(V, ◦) is the abelian additive group of the vector space. Each of these
structure will yield in general a different copy AGL(V, ◦) of the affine
group within Sym(V ). So, a trapdoor coming from an alternative vector
space structure, which we call hidden sum, can be embedded in a cipher,
whenever the permutation group generated by the round functions of the
cipher is contained in a conjugate of AGL(V ). In [5] the authors provide
conditions on the S-Boxes of a tb cipher that avoid attacks coming from
hidden sums. This result has been generalized to tb ciphers over any field
in [2]. Also, in [1], the authors studied such trapdoors, characterizing a
new class of vectorial Boolean functions, which they call anti-crooked,
able to avoid any hidden sum.
In the yet unpublished Ph.D thesis [9] the author investigated some
properties of affine groups, of a vector space over the binary field, with
respect to a hidden sum ◦. In particular, he focused on affine groups which
contain the translation group with respect to the usual sum +, and affine
groups whom translation group is contained in AGL(V ). In this paper we
study the differential properties of maps which are affine w.r.t. a hidden
sum. Our results are presented in Section 3, while in Section 2 we provide
some preliminaries from previous works. Our main result, Theorem 3,
concludes Section 3. Section 4 concludes this paper with the sketch of an
actual attack to a cipher in which a hidden sum trapdoor is embedded.
2 Preliminaries
Here we give some notation and some known results that we are going
to use along the paper. In the following, if not specified, V will be an
n-dimensional vector space over F2.
With the symbol + we refer to the usual sum over the vector space
V , and we denote by T+, AGL(V,+) and GL(V,+), respectively, the
translation, affine and linear groups w.r.t. +.
We recall that a p-elementary group G acting on a set Ω is a group
of permutations on Ω such that for all g in G we have gp = IdΩ .
A group G is called regular if for all a and b in Ω there exists a unique g
in G such that g(a) = b.
Remark 1. An elementary group acting on a vector space V = Fnp is obvi-
ously a p-elementary group. The translation group of V is an elementary
abelian regular group. Vice versa, we claim that if T is an elementary
abelian regular group, there exists a vector space structure (V, ◦) such
that T is the related translation group. In fact, from the regularity of
T we have T = {τa | a ∈ V } where τa is the unique map in T such that
0 7→ a. Then, defining the sum x◦a := τa(x), it is easy to check that (V, ◦)
is a commutative group, and so we can consider the group operation as
a sum, making it an additive group without loss of generality. Moreover,
let the multiplication of a vector by an element of Fp defined by
sv := v ◦ · · · ◦ v︸ ︷︷ ︸
s
, for all s ∈ Fp,
then it is easy to check that for all s, t ∈ Fp, and v,w ∈ V
s(v ◦ w) = sv ◦ sw,
(s + t)v = sv ◦ tv,
(st)v = s(tv)
and being T p-elementary pv = 0. Thus (V, ◦) is a vector space over
Fp. Observe that (V, ◦) and (V,+) are isomorphic vector space (since
|V | <∞).
For abelian regular subgroups of the affine group in [4] the authors
give a description of these in terms of commutative associative algebras
that one can impose on the vector space (V,+) or, in other words, of
products that can be defined on V and distribute the sum +. We report
the principal result shown in [4]. Recall that a (Jacobson) radical ring is
a ring (V,+, ·) in which every element is invertible with respect to the
circle operation x ◦ y = x+ y + x · y, so that (V, ◦) is a group. The circle
operation may induce a vector space structure on V or not.
Theorem 1. Let F be an arbitrary field, and (V,+) a vector space of
arbitrary dimension over F.
There is a one-to-one correspondence between
1) abelian regular subgroups T of AGL(V,+), and
2) commutative, associative F-algebra structures (V,+, ·) that one can
impose on the vector space structure (V,+), such that the resulting
ring is radical.
In this correspondence, isomorphism classes of F-algebras correspond
to conjugacy classes under the action of GL(V,+) of abelian regular sub-
groups of AGL(V,+).
We recall that an exterior algebra over an F-vector space V is the
F-algebra whose product is the wedge product ∧ having the following
properties:
1) x ∧ x = 0 for all x ∈ V ,
2) x ∧ y = −y ∧ x.
The elements of the exterior algebra over V are linear combinations of
monomials such as u, v ∧ w, x ∧ y ∧ z, etc., where u, v, w, x, y, and z are
vectors of V .
Remark 2. From the theorem above we can note that in characteristic
2, algebras corresponding to elementary abelian regular subgroups of
AGL(V,+) are exterior algebras or a quotient thereof.
We will denote by σa the translation in T+ such that x 7→ x + a.
We will use T◦ and AGL(V, ◦) to denote the translation and affine group
corresponding to a hidden sum ◦, that is when (V, ◦) is a vector space
and so T◦ is elementary abelian and regular.
As noted in the remark above, since T◦ is regular, for each a ∈ V there is
a unique map τa ∈ T◦ such that 0 7→ a. Thus
T◦ = {τa | a ∈ V }.
The relation between T◦ and AGL(V, ◦) is that AGL(V, ◦) is the nor-
malizer of T◦ in Sym(V ), that is AGL(V, ◦) is the largest subgroup of
Sym(V ) contaning T◦ such that T◦ is normal in it. Indeed, AGL(V,+) is
the normalizer of T+ and they are, respectively, the isomorphic images of
AGL(V, ◦) and T◦. With 1V we will denote the identity map of V .
Remark 3. If T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+), then τa = σaκ for some κ ∈ GL(V,+),
since AGL(V,+) = GL(V,+) ⋉ T+. We will denote by κa the linear map
κ corresponding to τa.
Let T ⊆ AGL(V,+) and define the set
U(T ) = {a | τ = σa, τ ∈ T}.
It is easy to check that U(T ) is a subspace of V , whenever T is a
subgroup. If T = T◦ for some operation ◦, then U(T◦) is not empty for
the following lemma.
Lemma 1 ([4]). Let T+ be the group of translation in AGL(V,+) and
let T ⊆ AGL(V,+) be a regular subgroup. Then, if V is finite T+ ∩ T is
nontrivial.
U(T◦) is important in the context of our theory and its dimension
gives fundamental information on the corresponding hidden sum.
3 On the differential uniformity of a ◦-affine map
Any round function of a translation-based block cipher (Definition 3.1
[6]) is composed by a parallel s-Box γ, a mixing layer λ and a translation
σk by the round key. The map γ must be as non-linear as possible to
create confusion in the message. An important notion of ”non-linearity”
of Boolean functions is the differential uniformity.
In this section we establish a lower bound on the differential uni-
formity of the maps lying in some AGL(V, ◦). We will consider the two
cases of affine group AGL(V, ◦) such that T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) and/or T+ ⊆
AGL(V, ◦). In both cases in the following proofs we can consider w.l.o.g.
maps f such that f(0) = 0. In fact in the first case we can compose f
with τf(0) that maps f(0) to 0 and in the second case we compose with
σf(0), in both cases we compose with an affine map.
We recall the definition of differential uniformity.
Definition 1. Let m,n ≥ 1. Let f : Fm2 → F
n
2 , for any a ∈ F
m
2 and
b ∈ Fn2 we define
δf (a, b) = |{x ∈ F
m
2 | f(x+ a) + f(x) = b}|.
The differential uniformity of f is
δ(f) = max
a∈Fm
2
, b∈Fn
2
a6=0
δf (a, b).
f is said δ-differential uniform if δ = δ(f).
We are ready for our first result.
Lemma 2. Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) and dim(U(T◦)) = k. Then f ∈ AGL(V, ◦)
is at least 2k differentially uniform.
Proof. Let a ∈ U(T◦), then
f(x+ a) + f(x) = f(x ◦ a) + f(x) = (f(x) ◦ f(a)) + f(x).
So, for all f(x) ∈ U(T◦) we have
(f(x) ◦ f(a)) + f(x) = (f(x) + f(a)) + f(x) = f(a),
that implies |{x | f(x+ a) + f(x) = f(a)}| ≥ 2k.
When T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦), we can define U◦(T+) = {a | σa ∈ T+ ∩ T◦}
and it is a vector subspace of (V, ◦). Then we obtain, analogously, the
following lemma.
Lemma 3. Let T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦) and dim(U◦(T+)) = k, as a subspace of
(V, ◦). Then f ∈ AGL(V, ◦) is at least 2k differentially uniform.
Recalling that given a ring R, r ∈ R is called nilpotent if there exists
an integer n such that rn = 0, while r ∈ R is called unipotent if and only
if r − 1 is nilpotent, we have the following:
Lemma 4. Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+). Then for each a ∈ V , κa has order 2
and it is unipotent.
Proof. We know that τa has order 2, because T◦ is elementary. Then,
τ2a = 1V implies τa(a) = 0, and in particular κa(a) = a. So
x = τ2a (x) = κa(κa(x) + a) + a = κ
2
a(x) + a+ a = κ
2
a(x) for all x ∈ V.
That implies (κa − 1V )
2 = κ2a − 1V = 0.
Remark 4. The lemma above can be easily generalized to any character-
istic p, in this case the order of κa would be p.
Remark 5. It is well known that a square matrix is unipotent if and only
if its characteristic polynomial P (t) is a power of t−1, i.e. it has a unique
eigenvalue equals to 1.
We recall the following definition.
Definition 2. Let A be an n×n matrix over a field F, with λ ∈ F along
the main diagonal and 1 along the diagonal above it, that is
A =


λ 1 . . . 0
0 λ 1 . . . 0
...
...
0 . . . λ

 .
Then A is called the n × n elementary Jordan matrix or Jordan block of
size n.
Definition 3. A matrix A defined over a field F is said to be in Jordan
canonical form if A is block-diagonal where each block is a Jordan block
defined over F.
The following theorem is well-known (see for instance [7]).
Theorem 2. Let A be an n × n matrix over a field F such that any
eigenvalue of A is contained in F, then there exists a matrix J defined
over F, which is in Jordan canonical form and similar to A.
Lemma 5. Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+). Then for each a ∈ V , κa fixes at least
2⌊
n−1
2
⌋+1 elements of V .
Proof. From Lemma 4, κa has a unique eigenvalue equals to 1 ∈ F2, then
from Theorem 2 there exists a matrix over F2 in the Jordan form similar
to κa. Thus, κa = AJA
−1, for some A, J ∈ GL(V,+) with
J =


1 α1 . . . 0
0 1 α2 . . . 0
...
...
0 . . . 1 αn−1
0 . . . 1


and J2 =


1 0 α1α2 . . . 0
0 1 0 α2α3 . . . 0
...
...
0 . . . 1 0 αn−2αn−1
0 . . . 1 0
0 . . . 1


.
where αi ∈ F2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
From the fact that J is conjugated to κa we have J
2 = 1V , and that
implies αiαi+1 = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 2.
Note that if αi = 1 then αi−1 and αi+1 have to be equal to 0. Thus we
have that when n is even at most n2 αi’s can be equal to 1. Then at least
n
2 elements of the canonical basis are fixed by J . When n is odd we have
at most n−12 αi’s equal to 1 and then at least
n−1
2 + 1 elements of the
canonical basis are fixed by J . Our claim follows from the fact that κa is
conjugated to J .
In terms of algebras we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+), and let (V,+, ·) be the associated
algebra of Theorem 1. Then for each a ∈ V , a · x is equal to 0 for at least
2⌊
n−1
2
⌋+1 elements x of V .
Remark 6. The bound on the number of elements fixed by κa given in
Lemma 5 is tight. In fact let (V,+, ·) be the exterior algebra over a vector
space of dimension three, spanned by e1, e2, e3. That is, V has basis
e1, e2, e3, e1 ∧ e2, e1 ∧ e3, e2 ∧ e3, e1 ∧ e2 ∧ e3.
We have that e1 · x = 0 for all x ∈ E = 〈e1, e1 ∧ e2, e1 ∧ e3, e1 ∧ e2 ∧ e3〉.
So, for all x ∈ E
x ◦ e1 = x+ e1 + x · e1 = x+ e1.
Vice versa if x ◦ e1 = x+ e1 then x ∈ E. The size of E is 2
4.
Lemma 6. Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+). Then f ∈ AGL(V, ◦) is at least 2
⌊n−1
2
⌋+1
differentially uniform.
Proof. From Lemma 1 there exists a ∈ U(T◦) different from zero. So
f(x+ a) + f(x) = f(x ◦ a) + f(x) = (f(x) ◦ f(a)) + f(x) =
(f(x) + f(a) + f(a) · f(x)) + f(x)
Now, from Corollary 1 we have that f(a) · f(x) = 0 for at least 2⌊
n−1
2
⌋+1
elements of V .
This implies |{x | f(x+ a) + f(x) = f(a)}| ≥ 2⌊
n−1
2
⌋+1.
Lemma 7. Let T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦). Then f ∈ AGL(V, ◦) is at least 2
⌊n−1
2
⌋+1
differentially uniform.
Proof. Note that Theorem 1, Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 hold also inverting
the operation ◦ and +. Then, there exists a ∈ V different from zero such
that x+a = x◦a for all x ∈ V . Considering the algebra (V, ◦, ·) such that
x+ y = x ◦ y ◦ x · y for all x, y ∈ V , we have
f(x+ a) + f(x) = f(x ◦ a) + f(x) = (f(x) ◦ f(a)) + f(x) =
(f(x) ◦ f(a)) ◦ f(x) ◦ f(x) · (f(x) ◦ f(a)) =
f(x) ◦ f(a) ◦ f(x) ◦ f(x) · f(x) ◦ f(x) · f(a).
From Remark 2, we have y2 = 0 for all y ∈ V , and from Corollary 1
f(x) · f(a) = 0 for at least 2⌊
n−1
2
⌋+1 elements. Thus
|{x | f(x+ a) + f(x) = f(a)}| ≥ 2⌊
n−1
2
⌋+1.
Summarizing our results in this section, especially Lemma 2, 3, 6, 7,
we obtain our theorem on the claimed differentiability.
Theorem 3. Let T◦ ⊆ AGL(V,+) (T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦), respectively). Let
f ∈ AGL(V, ◦). Then δ(f) ≥ 2m, where
– m = max{⌊n−12 ⌋+ 1,dim(U(T◦))}
– (m = max{⌊n−12 ⌋+ 1,dim(U◦(T+))}, respectively).
By a computer check we obtain the following fact.
Fact 1 Let V = Fn2 with n = 3, 4, 5. If T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦), let f ∈ AGL(V, ◦).
Then δ(f) ≥ 2n−1.
Remark 7. For n = 7, 8 there exist examples of functions that are affine
w.r.t. a hidden sum ◦ satisfying T+ ⊆ AGL(V, ◦) and δ(f) = 2
n−2. The
existence of these permutations and Fact 1 suggest that probably there
may exist bounds which are sharper than those in Theorem 3.
Remark 8. Note that if we consider f ∈ Sym(F42 ) with δ(f) = 4 then
the parallel map (f, f) acting on F82 is 2
6 differentially uniform. Thus the
differential uniformity may not guarantee, alone, security from a hidden
sum trapdoor!
4 A block cipher with a hidden sum
In this section we give an example, similar to that described in [1], of a
translation based block cipher in a small dimension, in which it is possible
to embed a hidden-sum trapdoor.
Let m = 3, n = 2, then d = 6 and we have the message space V = F62.
The mixing layer of our toy cipher is given by the matrix
λ =


0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0


Note that λ is a proper mixing layer (see Definition 3.2 [2]). The
bricklayer transformation γ = (γ1, γ2) of our toy cipher is given by two
identical S-boxes
γ1 = γ2 = α
4x6 + α3x4 + αx3 + α3x2 + x+ α6
where α is a primitive element of F23 such that α
3 = α+ 1.
The S-box γ1 is 4-differential uniform.
Consider the hidden sum ◦ over V1 = V2 = (F2)
3 induced by the
elementary abelian regular group T◦ = 〈τ1, τ2, τ3〉, where
τ1(x) = x·

1 0 00 1 1
0 0 1

+e1, τ2(x) = x·

1 0 10 1 0
0 0 1

+e2, τ3(x) = x·

1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

+e3,
(1)
with e1 = (1, 0, 0), e2 = (0, 1, 0) and e3 = (0, 0, 1). In other words, τi(x) =
x ◦ ei for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Obviously T = T◦×T◦ is an elementary abelian group inducing the hidden
sum (x1, x2) ◦
′ (y1, y2) = (x1 ◦ y1, x2 ◦ y2) on V = V1× V2. By a computer
check it results 〈T+, λγ〉 ⊆ AGL(V, ◦
′), and ◦′ is a hidden sum for our
toy cipher. It remains to verify whether it is possible to use it to attack
the toy cipher with an attack that costs less than brute force. We are
considering a cipher where the number of rounds is so large to make any
classical attack useless (such as differential cryptanalysis) and the key
scheduling offer no weakness. Therefore, the hidden sum will actually be
essential to break the cipher only if the attack that we build will cost
significantly less than 64 encryptions, considering that the key space is
F
6
2.
Remark 9. T◦ is generated by the translations corresponding to e1, e2 and
e3, which implies that the vectors e1, e2, e3 form a basis for (V1, ◦). Let
x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ V1, from (1) we can simply write
τ1(x) = (x1 + 1, x2, x2 + x3), τ2(x) = (x1, x2 + 1, x1 + x3), τ3(x) = (x1, x2, x3 + 1).
Let us write x as a linear combination of e1, e2 and e3 w.r.t. to the
sum ◦, i.e. x = λ1e1 ◦ λ2e2 ◦ λ3e3. We have that λ1 = x1, λ2 = x2 and
λ3 = λ1λ2 + x3. So
(x1, x2, x3) = x = (λ1, λ2, λ1λ2 + λ3) (2)
Thanks to the previous remark we can find the coefficients of a vec-
tor v′ = (v, u) ∈ V with respect to ◦′ by using the following algorithm
separately on the two bricks of v′.
Algorithm 1
Input: vector x ∈ F32
Output: coefficients λ1, λ2 and λ3.
[1] λ1 ← x1;
[2] λ2 ← x2;
[3] λ3 ← λ1λ2 + x3;
return λ1, λ2, λ3.
Let v′ = (v, u) ∈ V , we write
v = λv1e1 ◦ λ
v
2e2 ◦ λ
v
3e3 and u = λ
u
1e1 ◦ λ
u
2e2 ◦ λ
u
3e3.
We denote by
[v′] = [λv1, λ
v
2, λ
v
3, λ
u
1 , λ
u
2 , λ
u
3 ]
the vector with the coefficients obtained from the bricks of v′ using Algo-
rithm 1.
Let ϕ = ϕk be the encryption function, with a given unknown ses-
sion key k. We want to mount two attacks by computing the matrix M
and the translation vector t defining ϕ ∈ AGL(V, ◦′), so t = ϕ(0) and
[ϕ(x)] = [x] ·M + [t].
Assume we can call the encryption oracle. ThenM can be computed from
the 7 ciphertexts ϕ(0), ϕ(e′1), . . . , ϕ(e
′
6) (where e
′
1 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), . . . , e
′
6 =
(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1)), since the ([ϕ(e′i)] + [t])’s represent the matrix rows. In
other words, we will have
[ϕ(v′)] = [v′] ·M + [t], [ϕ−1(v′)] = ([v′] + [t]) ·M−1,
for all v′ ∈ V , where the product row by column is the standard scalar
product. The knowledge ofM , t andM−1 provides a global deduction (re-
construction), since it becomes trivial to encrypt and decrypt. In fact, to
encrypt v it is enough to compute [v], applying [v] 7→ [v]·M+[t] = [w] and
then pass from [w] to the standard representation w via (2). Analogously
to decrypt. However, following [1], we have an alternative depending on
how we compute M−1, resulting in one attack with 7 encryptions and
another with 7 encryptions and 7 decryptions. Both are much faster than
brute-force searching in the keyspace.
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